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Abstract
Conventional wisdom states that the statutory split of labor taxes be-
tween firms and workers is of no macroeconomic relevance, because the
tax incidence is fully determined by the market structure. This paper
breaks with this view by establishing a theoretical link between the lia-
bility side of labor taxes and the business cycle volatility of prices and
wages. It is shown that funding a social security system by a wage tax
(paid by workers) significantly reduces the volatility in nominal variables
relative to the volatility under a payroll tax (paid by firms). The gain in
price and wage stability reduces inefficiencies in the equilibrium allocation
of the stochastic model and thereby welfare costs of business cycle fluc-
tuations. In a standard DSGE model calibrated for a European country,
switching the liability side reduces welfare costs by 11.25%. Since the
long-run income distribution is not affected, the finding points out room
for Pareto improvement.
JEL classification: H55, H21, E30, E32, E60, D02.
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1 Introduction
Economists have long understood that under price flexibility, the burden of a
transaction tax will be shared according to the price elasticities of demand and
supply. This insight, going back to Dalton (1922), is known as liquidity-side-
equivalence (LSE) and is a standard component of economic training. In the
context of the labor market, LSE implies that the liability side of a tax on labor
is of no consequence for the distribution of the tax burden between employer
and employees. Hence it does not matter to which share a tax is levied on
the side of workers (as a 'wage tax') and on the side of firms (as a 'payroll
tax'). This conclusion has been challenged from different perspectives. In labor
economics, there is a strand of literature that examines whether LSE holds in
the presence of market imperfections, i.e. in the context of efficiency-wage and
wage-bargaining models (see, among others, Picard and Toulemonde (2001),
Rasmussen (1998) or Koskela and Schöb (1999)). Regarding empirical work,
Lehmann et al. (2011) test for LSE in a non-experimental setup, while Weber
and Schram (2013) conduct a laboratory experiment to analyze the implications
of the liability side arising from bounded rationality.
This paper is the first to approach LSE of labor taxation from a general
equilibrium perspective. Using a standard quantitative business cycle model, it
establishes a link between the liability side of social security contributions (levied
as a tax on labor) and welfare costs of business cycle fluctuations. This finding
does not challenge the validity of LSE itself, since LSE holds in the model to
the extend that prices and wages adjust. However, the finding contributes that,
although the liability side is neutral for the distribution of the tax burden, it is
not neutral for business cycle fluctuations. That is, the result does not challenge
LSE in the 'classical sense', but it shows that the liability side of labor taxation
is non-neutral in the broader sense that it matters for macroeconomic stability.
Establishing this role of the liability side of social security contributions
relates the paper to two further strands of literature. The presented link is of
relevance to the literature on public finance, as it points out a novel aspect of
the design of labor taxation. Regarding the literature on automatic stabilizers,
this paper contributes that the liability side matters for the degree of passive
stabilization provided by the system. This literature fully neglects this design
dimension and focuses on how taxes and transfers cushion disposable income
over the cycle.1
The theoretical finding of this paper states that if social contributions are
levied as wage tax, business cycle volatility in nominal variables is lower relative
to the volatility under the use of a payroll tax. As a result, welfare costs of
business cycle fluctuations are lower if the system is funded by a wage tax.
Quantitatively, a full shift of labor taxation from firms to workers reduces welfare
costs by 11.25% in a standard New Keynesian business cycle model calibrated
to a typical European country with a sizable welfare system.
1See Furceri (2010) for a recent overview.
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Before sketching the mechanism behind this result, I discuss the only non-
standard assumption it requires. The finding rests on the assumption that the
social contributions rate (SCR) is subject to adjustments in response to distur-
bances in the macroeconomic environment. These adjustments can have two
different causes in the model. The first cause are fluctuations in outflows of the
social system, to the extent that these fluctuations affect its financing needs and
trigger adjustments in social security revenues that are implemented by chang-
ing the SCR. Cyclicality of outflows, especially from unemployment insurance
schemes, is a standard result in the literature on automatic stabilizers. The
second cause for adjustments in the SCR are fluctuations in total labor com-
pensation, which is the tax base of social contributions levied as a tax on labor.
If the SCR was not adjusted, cyclical movements in total labor compensation
would translate into fluctuations in social security revenues. A government that
seeks to maintain a given level of revenues therefore has to adjust the SCR to
offset changes in the tax base. As a first assessment of the empirical plausibility
of this assumption, the following graph shows the evolution of the statutory SCR
in Germany. The mean deviation from the HP-filtered series amounts to 0.34%2,
which is shown to be sufficient to generate significant welfare implications of the
liability side.
Figure 1: German statutory social contributions rate
Turning to the intuition of the result, I first establish that shifting the liabil-
ity side from firms to workers implies that the change in the SCR that is required
to bring about a given adjustment in revenues becomes smaller in magnitude.
Since LSE holds in the model, shifting the taxation towards workers implies an
increase of pre-tax wages in compensation of the additional nominal tax bur-
den. In the aggregate, this implies a rise in (pre-tax) total labor compensation.
The key insight is that if total labor compensation is higher, a given change in
revenues (the product of tax base and tax rate) requires a smaller change in the
SCR.
This observation intuitively implies that the volatility in the SCR required to
bring about a given stochastic pattern of revenue adjustments becomes smaller.
That is, adjusting revenues can be by achieved with a more stable SCR if the
system is funded by a wage tax. This implies a reduction in welfare costs of busi-
ness cycle fluctuations, because it lowers the volatility in nominal variables and
2The smoothing parameter λ = 6.25 was applied as in Burda and Weder (2014). Data
source: The German Council of Economic Experts.
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thereby the degree of inefficiencies in the equilibrium allocation associated with
price and wage dispersion. The reason why a more stable SCR implies more sta-
ble prices and wages is that changes in the SCR trigger nominal re-adjustments.
Levied on the side of workers, changes in the SCR move after-tax real wages and
thereby cause adjustments in nominal wages. On the side of firms, variations in
the SCR move effective marginal costs and trigger price adjustments. It is well
known that price and wage volatility contributes to the welfare costs of business
cycle fluctuations. As e.g. described in Woodford (2003), nominal adjustments
are associated with price and wage dispersion, which induces a resource cost as
it lowers the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation. Hence, inducing a more
stable SCR reduces nominal volatility and thereby the efficiency loss from this
source, implying a reduction of the welfare costs of business cycle fluctuations.
Regarding the policy relevance of the finding, two remarks are in order. The
first is that the mechanism presented in this paper is disconnected from the well
understood Keynesian-type stabilization provided by social security systems.
As the liability side does not affect the amount of generated revenues, it is
neutral to the general financial stance of the system and thereby neutral to
the means of the social system to stabilize income over the cycle. The liability
side therefore constitutes a political control variable that is not in conflict with
this desirable property of the welfare system. The second remark is that the
liability side has, due to LSE, no long-run implications for the average ratio
between profits and labor income. Hence, if a one-time shift of the statutory
taxation towards workers is accompanied by a compensating rise in nominal
wages, it is fully neutral to the income distribution in the economy. In this
case changing the liability side induces a Pareto improvement, as it does not
entail redistribution but all households benefit from the induced efficiency gain.
Only then is it desirable from the perspective of the author. Since the statutory
contribution to social security paid by workers is below 50% in vast majority of
OECD countries, the findings imply substantial room for Pareto improvements.3
Section 2 lays out the model and discusses the calibration. Section 3 and 4
explain the findings in detail. Welfare results and robustness checks are reported
in section 5, and the paper concludes with section 6.
2 The model
This paper employs a standard closed-economy New Keynesian DSGE model.
The economy is populated by a continuum of firms and a continuum of infinitely-
lived households. Firms produce differentiated intermediate goods, which are
aggregated into a final goods bundle consumed by households. Likewise, house-
holds supply differentiated types of labor, which enter the production function
subject to aggregation into a composite of labor services. Price and wage set-
ting is staggered by Calvo mechanisms. The model features a social security
system which is financed by a wage tax and/or a payroll tax, i.e. by a labor
3Table 5 in the appendix reports the statutory split for 21 OECD countries. From this
sample, 19 countries have a statutory share of workers of below 50%.
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tax that is levied on the side of workers and/or firms. Revenues are reimbursed
as lump-sum transfers to households. A government consumes according to an
exogenous process, with public consumption defined as plain waste. Its expen-
ditures are fully financed by lump-sum taxes in every period. Monetary policy
is governed by a standard Taylor rule. There are two sources of uncertainty
in the economy: Productivity shocks entering the production technology and
demand shocks entering government spending. The remainder of this section
presents the different building blocks of the model as well as its calibration.
2.1 Households
Each household on the continuum is indexed by j ∈ [0, 1], but the index is sup-
pressed in this section for ease of notation. Households choose consumption as
to maximize their expected life-time utility. Hours worked are determined by la-
bor demand because households reduce their labor supply below the competitive
level to make use of their market power.
Life-time utility is given by:
Ut = Et
∞∑
k=0
βk
{
c1−γt+k
1− γ −
n1+φt+k
1 + φ
}
where nt+k are hours worked in period t+ k and ct+k is the consumption of the
final goods bundle in that period. The maximization is subject to a series of
period budget constraints given by
Ptct + (1/it)bt ≤ bt−1 + (1− τwt )wt
∫ 1
0
nt (i) di+ ssbt − taxt + Πt . (1)
Pt is the economy's price index defined below and it is the gross nominal inter-
est rate on the one-period riskless nominal bond bt assumed to mature at the
beginning of period t + 1. The portion of social security contributions levied
as wage tax on the side of workers (rate τwt ) is deducted from nominal labor
income wt
∫ 1
0
nt (i) di, where the integral constitutes the total remuneration the
household receives from renting its differentiated type of labor to all firms on
the continuum. ssbt are social security benefits, taxt are lump-sum taxes levied
by the government and Πt denotes nominal profits from the ownership of firms.
The problem leads to a standard consumption Euler equation given by
qt = βEt
{(
ct
ct+k
)γ
Pt
Pt+1
}
.
The Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate ct consumed by households consists of all vari-
eties ct (i) produced by firms, each indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Aggregation into final
goods ct can be thought of as being conducted by a competitive final-goods firm
with technology
ct ≡
(∫ 1
0
ct (i)
1− 1 di
) 
−1
. (2)
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Cost-efficient composition of variations implies the following demand schedule
for the variation produced by firm i, where pt (i) denotes its price:
ct (i) =
(
pt (i)
Pt
)−
ct . (3)
The economy's aggregate price index is defined as
Pt ≡
[∫ 1
0
pt (i)
1−
di
] 1
1−
. (4)
2.2 Firms and inflation dynamics
Since variations produced by different firms are imperfect substitutes in aggrega-
tor (2), firms possess market power which they use to extract profits. Assuming
price stickiness à la Calvo (1983), only a random share 1− θ of firms is allowed
to re-optimize prices in each period. Firms' production technologies are linear
in a composite of all differentiated labor services supplied by households.
A firm i produces its good variation yt(i) with the linear production function
yt (i) = Atnt (i) (5)
where productivity is governed by logAt = ρ
A logAt−1+At with 
A
t ∼ N
(
0, σA
)
allowing for aggregate productivity shocks. Firm i's labor composite nt(i) con-
tains labor-variations nt(i, j) supplied by all households on the continuum:
nt (i) ≡
{∫ 1
0
nt (i, j)
1− 1w dj
} w
w−1
. (6)
Analogous to demand equation (3), the cost-minimizing composition of different
types of labor implies the following demand schedule for type-j labor:
nt (i, j) =
(
wt (j)
Wt
)−w
nt (i) (7)
where wt(j) is the wage charged by household j for its labor service and Wt is
the aggregate wage index defined by
Wt ≡
{∫ 1
0
wt (j)
1−w dj
} 1
1−w
. (8)
Using (7) and (8), firm i's total wage bill can be expressed as∫ 1
0
(
1 + τft
)
wt (j)nt (i, j) dj =
(
1 + τft
)
Wtnt (i) (9)
where τft governs the portion of social security contributions levied as payroll
tax on the side of firms.
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Since the government is assumed to consume the same final goods bundle as
households do, total demand for the variety produced by firm i is given by
yt (i) =
(
pt (i)
Pt
)−
[Ct +Gt] (10)
where Ct =
∫ 1
0
ct (j) dj is aggregate private consumption and Gt government
consumption.
The price setting problem of a firm i allowed to re-optimize the price for its
good variation pt(i) is
max
pt(i)
Et
∞∑
k=0
Qt,t+kθ
k
{
yt+k|t (i) pt (i)−Ψt+k
(
yt+k|t (i)
)}
where yt+k|t (i) is the firm's period t+ k output given that the price set today
remains valid up to this period, which occurs in a Calvo setup with probability
θk. Qt,t+k ≡ βk (ct+k/ct)−γ (Pt/Pt+k) is the stochastic discount factor. The
cost function Ψt (.) represents the firm's total wage bill (9), which under the use
of (5) can be written as
Ψt+k
(
yt+k|t (i)
)
=
(
1 + τft+k
)
Wt+k
yt+k|t (i)
At+k
.
Optimal price setting subject to demand schedule (10) is governed by the FOC
Et
∞∑
k=0
Qt,t+kθ
kyt+k|t
{
p∗t −

(− 1)
(
1 + τft+k
)
Wt+kA
−1
t+k
}
= 0 (11)
where p∗t is the price set by all firms allowed to re-optimize in the current period.
Combined with the definition of the aggregate price level (4), this FOC implies
a standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve.
2.3 Wage setting
Nominal wage rigidity is introduced by using the apparatus of Erceg et al.
(2000), which closely resembles the structure of the goods market. Households
exert market power on the labor market because labor services supplied by
different households are imperfect substitutes in aggregator (6). Each household
is assumed to be represented by its own labor union which sets the household-
specific wage rate subject to a Calvo-constraint, i.e. only a random share 1−θw
of unions is allowed to adjust wages in each period.
The labor union operating on behalf of household j chooses this household's
wage rate wt (j) as to maximize its expected present value of utility:
max
wt(j)
Et
{ ∞∑
k=0
(βθw)
k
U
(
ct+k|t (j) , nt+k|t (j)
)}
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where ct+k|t (j) and nt+k|t (j) are period t + k consumption and hours given
that the newly set wage is in place up to that period. It can be shown that the
optimal wage w∗t satisfies the following FOC:
Et
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)
k
MUt+k|tnt+k|t
[(
1− τwt+k
)
w∗t
Pt+k
− w
(w − 1)MRSt+k|t
]
= 0 (12)
where nt+k|t = (w∗t /Wt+k)
−w (Nt+k/swt+k) is period t + k total demand for
type-j labor, given that the wage rate is w∗t .
4 MUt+k|t and MRSt+k|t denote
household j's marginal utility and marginal rate of substitution in period t +
k under the same condition. Combined with the definition of the aggregate
wage index (8), this FOC governs the evolution of aggregate wages. It implies
that nominal wages are set such that the weighted average of future after-tax
real wages is, in expectations, a mark-up over the weighted average of future
marginal rates of substitution.
2.4 Social security
The social security system is modeled as simple redistribution device, reimburs-
ing all revenues to households. Contributions are levied as wage tax and/or
payroll tax. The statutory breakdown (i.e. the relative weight of τwt and τ
f
t ) is
exogenously given and varied across different scenarios. The budget reads as:(
τwt + τ
f
t
)
NtWt = ssbt (13)
where NtWt, the product of wage index (8) and employment index (15) defined
below, is the tax base total labor compensation. In the following, the term
'SCR' refers to τwt + τ
f
t . The system's outflows (social security benefits) ssbt
enter the household's budget (1) as lump-sum transfers and are determined by:
ssbt = ssb + ηt , ηt = ρ
ssbηt−1 + ssbt (14)
with ssbt ∼ N
(
0, σssb
)
.
The specification implies that the social system runs a balanced budget as
in Burda and Weder (2014). Since inflows are instantaneously reimbursed as
lump-sum transfers, the amount of resources that the system redistributes is of
no consequence for the income of households. The only effect of a change in
ssbt is therefore to raise the requirement of a SCR adjustment that induces a
corresponding change in revenues.5 That is, apart from generating adjustments
4Nt is the aggregate employment index (15) and is swt a wage dispersion term, both in-
troduced below. To obtain this demand schedule, notice that a household charges the same
wage to all firms renting its labor service, so (7) implies that total demand for type-j la-
bor is given by nt (j) =
∫ 1
0 nt (i, j) di =
(
wt(j)
Wt
)−w ∫ 1
0 nt (i) di. Substituting the corollary∫ 1
0 nt (i) di =
Nt
swt
(see derivation of (16) in the appendix) yields the equation.
5Variations in the degree of distortions in the economy can be neglected for small deviations.
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in the SCR, the social system is irrelevant in the model. In the following I argue
why this property is not only admissible but also favorable for this analysis.
To see why it is admissible, recall that this paper compares macroeconomic
stability under different liability sides. As the SCR always adjusts as to raise
the exogenously given amount of revenues ssbt, the liability side is of no conse-
quence for the budgetary stance of the system. Put differently, the liability side
is disconnected from financial aspects of the system because it affects how but
not how much revenue is generated. Hence, the liability side is also irrelevant
for how much the system disburses and how the outflows are put to use. This
disconnect allows to abstract from the expenditure side, i.e. from macroeco-
nomic implications of the system's outflows (e.g. Keynesian-type stabilization)
when comparing scenarios of different liability sides. The reason is that due
to the disconnect, the implications of the expenditure side are in all scenarios
identical and therefore drop out in a comparison. In other words, this paper
looks at a property of the system that has no further implications for the system
itself, which allows to abstract from the system's macroeconomic implications
that are outside of the scope of this paper.
This property of the specification is favorable for this analysis as it implies
that imposing a dynamic pattern on ssbt has no other implications in the model
than affecting the dynamic pattern of revenue adjustments (the driving force of
the mechanism presented in this paper). It follows that one can freely choose
a dynamic behavior of ssbt such that it induces, jointly with the endogenous
dynamic of the tax base, empirically plausible dynamic revenue adjustments.
This raises the question of how to relate revenue adjustments to the data. The
empirical strategy I pursue is to use the dynamic pattern of ssbt to target em-
pirically observed dynamics of the SCR. In particular, ρssb and σssb are chosen
in the baseline calibration as to bring about endogenous SCR adjustments with
σ (scrt) = 0.35% and ρ (scrt, gdpt) = −0.4 under equal taxation of firms and
workers. That is, under the statutory breakdown valid for Germany, the model
endogenously generates moments of the SCR that are in line with empirical
evidence for this country.6
The following consideration justifies this choice of an empirical counterpart
and explains why assuming a balanced budget does not reduce the generality
of the model.7 From the logic of the mechanism driving the results of this
paper, the only requirement on an observed change in the SCR to qualify as
counterpart to a revenue adjustment is that it is implemented with the aim
to affect the amount of inflows. Since it does not matter how additionally
6In the baseline model, outflows ssbt are assumed to fluctuate exogenously around their
mean of ssb. The model nevertheless generates the empirically plausible negative correlation
between SCR and output. This is due to the fact that total labor compensation moves cyclical,
so e.g. in a downturn, total labor compensation declines and lowers revenues for a given SCR.
This requires an compensating upward-adjustment to keep revenues constant. Later on in
this paper, the assumption of exogenous outflows is relaxed to account for a broader set of
dynamic patterns of revenue adjustments.
7Social systems are in many countries allowed to run deficits. It is explained in the following
why it would be pointless to take this explicitly into account by departing from the balanced
budget assumption.
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raised funds (induced by SCR↑) are put to use or how a reduction in inflows
(induced by SCR↓) is financed, all changes in the statutory SCR naturally
constitute valid empirical counterparts for revenue adjustments in the sense
of the mechanism. This fact, together with the property of the model that
fluctuations in outflows are irrelevant, allows to implicitly account for capital
market access of social systems. The key insight is that the strategy to replicate
empirically observed patterns in revenue adjustments is legitimate even if in
reality, revenue adjustments were induced in order to affect some deficit/surplus.
To see why, consider e.g. an observed revenue increase aimed at reducing a
deficit. In the calibration strategy, this revenue adjustment is replicated in the
model by a corresponding increase in ssbt. This is inaccurate to the extent
that the observed adjustment did not go along with an surge in outflows, as
the additional funds were used repay some debt. However, as fluctuations in
outflows are irrelevant, this inaccuracy is of no consequence in the model.
The fact that it is admissible to replicate adjustments that are in reality
aimed at affecting a deficit/surplus allows to account for the implications that
the possibility of accessing capital markets has for the finding of this paper. This
is implicitly done in my calibration strategy, as the observed policy decisions
that I use as empirical counterpart were decided on having the option to take
on debt of the social system. Hence, the implications that this possibility has
on the actual decision to affect revenues  the driving force of my results  is
already incorporated in the data. Put differently, as the data I use is 'net of'
having the option to access capital markets, I account for the implications that
this option has on the effect I present in this paper.
2.5 Government and monetary policy
As widely done in the literature, exogenous disturbances in aggregate demand
are modeled by introducing stochastic government spending in addition to the
social security system. The government is assumed to consume the same final-
goods bundle as households. Its consumption Gt is defined as plain waste and
exogenously determined by
Gt =
(
1− ρG)G+ ρGGt−1 + Gt
with Gt ∼ N
(
0, σG
)
.8 I assume that expenditures are fully financed by lump-
sum taxes in every period, so Gt = taxt. Note that one could equally well
combine government consumption and social security into one entity without
changing the model.
Monetary policy is assumed to target zero inflation. Its policy is governed
by the following standard Taylor rule:
it = β
−1 + αpi (pit+1 − 1)
8This specification of public spending is widely used in the literature, see e.g. Evers (2012).
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where pit denotes inflation. In a robustness check, the Taylor Rule is altered as
to account for the monetary policy stance faced by a single member state of a
monetary union.
2.6 Resource constraint
The resource constraint of the model economy has to account for resource costs
resulting from inefficiencies in the equilibrium allocation that arise in the pres-
ence of price and wage dispersion. Closely related to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2007), the relation between output of the final consumption good and the re-
quired amount of labor is established by defining aggregate employment Nt as
total labor performed by all households j in all firms i:
Nt =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
nt (i, j) didj (15)
as shown in the appendix of this paper, it follows that
Nt = s
p
t s
w
t
Ct +Gt
At
(16)
where spt =
∫ 1
0
(
pt(i)
pt
)−
di and swt =
∫ 1
0
(
wt(j)
wt
)−w
dj are dispersion terms
which are equal to their lower bound of one in the absence of dispersion.
2.7 Calibration
In the baseline version, the model is calibrated for a typical member country of
the European Union with a sizable welfare system. The Calvo probabilities for
price and wage rigidity are chosen to match the empirical findings of Druant
et al. (2009). In their recent study on the Euro Area, the authors report an av-
erage lifetime of prices and wages of 9.6 and 12.5 months respectively (excluding
the outliner Italy). The elasticity of substitution between different variations of
goods and types of labor match the respective mark-ups estimated in Basu and
Kimball (1997) and Chari et al. (2002). Steady state government spending of
G = 0.2 is also used in Evers (2012). The steady state size of the social security
system ssb amounts to 14.2% GDP, which is lower than the figures observed in
Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany and the Netherlands
(see table 5 in the appendix). Together with government consumption, this
implies a public spending ratio of 36%.
Regarding the exogenous processes for productivity and government spend-
ing, I follow Evers (2012) in using the standard parameter of 0.95 for ρA while
calibrating ρG, σA and σG as to match empirically observed moments of gov-
ernment spending and output in the Euro Area.9 The resulting parameters
9His sample covers nine European countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) over the sample period 1999Q1 to 2007Q4. The
author applied an HP filter with smoothing parameter 1600 on the data in logs. He reports
standard deviations of output and government spending of 0.87 and 0.83 percent respectively.
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are roughly in line with the ones used in his study which employs a related
model. Turning to the specification of the social system, parameters ρssb and
σssb are, as outlined above, used to target empirical observations of σ(scrt) and
ρ(scrt, gdpt) for Germany. Choosing ρ
ssb = 0.95 and σssb = 0.0007 (imply-
ing a mean deviation of ssbt of half a percent of its steady state value), the
model generates σ(scrt) = 0.35% (as observed for the statutory rate in Ger-
many, see introduction) and ρ(scrt, gdpt) = −0.4. While this figure is in line
with the observation for Germany by Burda and Weder (2014)10 (see table 4
in the appendix), the baseline assumption of exogenously fluctuating outflows
is generalized in section 4.2 to account for a broad set of dynamic patterns in
revenue adjustments.
Table 1: Baseline calibriation
Parameter Value Motivation / Target
β Discount factor 0.99 Annual risk-free rate of 4%
γ Relative risk aversion 1 Log-utility
φ−1 Frisch elasticity of labour supply 1 Kimball and Shapiro (2008)
 Elasticity of substitution goods variations 10 11% price mark-up, Basu and Kimball (1997)
w Elasticity of substitution types of labor 7.4 15% wage mark-up, Chari et al. (2002)
θ Calvo probability firms 0.6875 Avg. lifetime 9.6 months, Druant et al. (2009)
θw Calvo probability unions 0.76 Avg. lifetime 12.5 months, Druant et al. (2009)
αpi Inflation coefficient in Taylor rule 1.5 Standard
G Steady state government Spending 0.2 Evers (2012)
ssb Steady state social s. expenditures 0.13 14.2% of steady state GDP
Shock processes
σA Std. innovations of technology process 0.0044 Matches std(gdp) in the data
ρA persistence technology shock 0.95 Chari et al. (2002)
σG Std. innovations of gov't spending process 0.0013 Matches std(G) in the data
ρG persistence gov't spending shock 0.66 Matches std(G)/std(gdp) in the data
σssb Std. innovations of social s. expenditures 0.0007
}
Matches data: σ(scrt) = 0.35%
and ρ(scrt, gdpt) = −0.4ρssb persistence social s. expenditures 0.95
10One drawback of using this data is that the moments are reported for a constructed
measure of the SCR that is computed as the ratio of social security revenues to total labor
compensation. Movements in this 'effective SCR' do not necessarily reflect changes in the
statutory SCR (and thereby policy decisions to adjust revenues), but can also be due to caps
to social security contributions. Since total labor compensation varies over the cycle, the share
of contracts for which caps are binding is also cyclical. This affects total revenues and thereby
the descriptive statistics of the 'effective SCR'. However, the example of Germany suggests
that movements due to caps are not necessarily of major relevance. Figure 7 in the appendix
plots trend deviations of the statutory SCR (not picking up the effect of caps) with deviations
of the 'effective' SCR (picking up the effects of caps), showing a very strong co-movement
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3 Nominal volatility and the liability side
This section develops the main intuition for the results. As agents in the model
are fully rational, LSE holds in the context of labor taxation to the extent that
prices and wages adjust. Regarding tax incidence, levying social contributions
as wage tax on the side of workers is equivalent in the long run to the use
of a payroll tax on the firm's side. By implication, neutrality also holds for
all intermediate distributions of statutory taxation between both sides. That
is, the elasticities of demand and supply determine one unique level of long-
run after-tax real wages (referred to as RW ) that holds for all intermediate
distributions.11 As the real allocation in the long run is decoupled from the
distribution between both sides, the only role of the distribution is to pin down
a level of pre-tax real wages that implies RW for this particular tax structure. It
follows that in the deterministic steady state of the model, in which the flexible
price/wage allocation holds, the real allocation is fully independent of how social
contributions are split between both sides, while the split maps into real wages
RW in the set
{
(RW, τw) | (1− τw)RW = RW}.
To see how this property emerges from the model structure, consider a styl-
ized example in which after tax real profits and after-tax real labor income
are governed by Y − (1 + τf) WP N and (1− τw) WP N respectively. In an ini-
tial steady state, prices and wages have fully adjusted such that RW prevails.
Now let the statutory taxation be surprisingly and permanently shifted towards
workers, i.e. τw ↑ and τf ↓. This change in the tax structure instantaneously
increases profits and reduces labor income, because prices and wages do not
adjust in real time due to nominal rigidity. However, in this model, nominal
variables start to gradually re-adjust with a decline in prices and an increase in
wages.12 Both adjustments lead to an increase in pre-tax real wages, thereby
revoking the immediate redistribution towards profit income caused by the shift
in the tax structure. This adjustment holds on until RW (and with it the initial
level of after-tax real profits) is restored. Hence, the shift of taxation towards
workers is neutral in the long run apart from raising pre-tax real wages.
The remainder of this section explains how the statutory breakdown of social
contributions between both sides is, despite its apparent disconnect from real
allocation, relevant for the business cycle volatility of prices and wages. The
link between nominal volatility and welfare is discussed in section 4.
Again note that the argument I present in the following rests on the as-
sumption that a public authority dynamically adjusts the SCR with the aim of
influencing the revenue position of the social system. Adjustments can either be
driven by variations in the amount of revenues that the authority seeks to raise,
11In a strict sense, the unconditional expectation of after-tax real wages in the ergodic
distribution depends on the breakdown of social contributions between both sides. The reason
is that, as shown later on, production efficiency depends on the latter. However, this is
neglected in the discussion of why LSE in the 'classical sense' holds in the model.
12Prices decline because τf ↓ enters marginal costs and therefore reduces the optimal price
in FOC (11). Wages increase because optimal wage setting (12) schedules a stabilization of
after-tax real wages, implying nominal wages to rise in compensation for τw ↑.
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or aimed at offsetting disturbances in revenues caused by cyclical fluctuations in
total labor compensation, the tax base of social contributions. To measure the
size of these adjustments, it will prove convenient to define the 'funding gap'
as the difference between the amount of funds the authority seeks to raise and
the amount of funds that it would raise, for the given tax base, if the SCR was
not adjusted. That it, the funding gap measures the absolute size of a revenue
adjustment that is required to raise the desired amount of tax revenues for the
given tax base. Using this measure, the assumption of this paper is that the
funding gap is volatile.
The core finding of this paper is that shifting the statutory taxation towards
workers lowers the volatility in the SCR that is implied by a given stochastic
structure of revenue adjustments, i.e. of the funding gap. To illustrate this
result, I first establish that the absolute size of a SCR adjustment that mirrors
a given funding gap is declining in the steady state tax base. To this aim, the
budget equation (13) is rewritten by splitting the variables into their steady
state components (denoted by a bar) and deviations (denoted by a delta):
(scr + ∆scrt) ∗
(
NW + ∆ (NW )t
)
= ssb+ ∆ssbt
where scr is τwt +τ
f
t , with weights varying over different scenarios. The funding
gap reads as gapt ≡ ∆ssbt − scr ∗ ∆(NW )t, summarizing the two sources of
adjustment.13 Subtracting the steady state relationship scr ∗ NW = ssb and
substituting the definition of gapt yields
∆scrt = gapt
[
NW + ∆ (NW )
]−1
which shows that the required adjustment ∆scrt mirroring a given funding gap
gapt is declining in steady state total labor compensation NW .
This intuitively implies that a given dynamic structure in revenue adjust-
ments can be brought about by smaller dynamic adjustments in the SCR if
steady state total labor compensation is higher. That is, a given volatility in
the funding gap translates into a smaller volatility in the SCR. This insight, com-
bined with the fact that a shift of statutory taxation towards workers is neutral
apart from inducing an offsetting rise in NW , establishes the main intuition of
this paper: Levying social contributions to a higher share on the side of workers
has no long-run distributional consequences because of LSE, but implies that
given revenue adjustments can be achieved with a more stable SCR.
To complete the link between the liability side and volatility of prices and
wages, note that social contributions are part of effective production costs (as
payroll tax), and determine after-tax wages for given pre-tax wages (as wage
tax). As a result, fluctuations in the SCR trigger nominal re-adjustments, since
they affect effective marginal costs in firms' FOC (11) (on the firms' side) as
well as after-tax real wages in labor unions' FOC (12) (on the workers' side).
13Under a balanced budget, scheduled revenues are equal to outflows, so ∆ssbt accounts
for the first reason for a nonzero funding gap. scr ∗∆(NW )t accounts for the second reason:
Fluctuations in revenues due to disturbances in the tax base, given that the SCR is constant.
14
Shifting the statutory taxation towards workers therefore has two implications.
It reduces the size of SCR fluctuations and thereby overall nominal volatility,
while it also shifts the side where SCR fluctuations induce nominal readjust-
ments towards wages.
So far, this section provided a simplified account of the mechanism to explain
the intuition. However, a thorough quantitative analysis has to be conducting
in a general equilibrium framework. The remainder of this section presents
impulse response functions to shed light on the link between the liability side and
volatility of prices and wages, accounting for general equilibrium repercussions.
General equilibrium analysis
This subsection contains three exercises, each contrasting the adjustment to an
exogenous shock if the social system is funded by a wage tax (circled lines) with
the adjustment occurring if it is funded by a payroll tax (solid lines). The first
exercise is a reduction in social security revenues, proving the claim that a given
revenue adjustment induces less movement in nominal variables if contributions
are levied on the side of workers. The second and the third exercise shows the
adjustment to a productivity and a demand shock respectively. All descriptions
focus on fluctuations in nominal variables, since the link between the liability
side and nominal volatility constitutes the predominant driver for the welfare
results presented in the next section.
Exogenous change in social security benefits
The figure below shows the adjustment to an exogenous reduction of social
security benefits in the magnitude of 1% GDP. Due to the balanced budget
assumption, the negative realization of ssbt ceteris paribus causes a revenue
adjustment in equal magnitude.
Before turning to the differences in the adjustment in both scenarios, notice
that for the reason outlined above, the decline in the SCR required to lower
revenues by 1% GDP is substantially weaker if they are collected from work-
ers. We begin by examining the scenario of payroll taxes (no markers). The
decline of the SCR directly reduces effective marginal costs, which leads firms
to reduce prices and the central bank to respond by implementing a negative
deviation of the real interest rate. Consumption and output surge as a result.
Regarding the evolution of wages, we observe a decline in wage inflation but
an increase in after-tax real wages. To understand this adjustment, recall that
labor unions' FOC (12) schedules a stabilization of future after-tax real wages
around a mark-up over future marginal rates of substitution. Since the strong
decline in prices elevates after-tax real wages on a level above the one which
is optimal for the equilibrium path of the MRS, labor unions reduce nominal
wages. The adjustment of wage inflation has a hump-shaped form because this
downward pressure on wages is at the beginning of the adjustment offset by the
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initial jump of the MRS, in turn resulting from the surge in hours.
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Figure 2: Reduction of social security benefits in the magnitude of 1% GDP.
Solid lines: taxing firms vs. marked lines: taxing workers.
Turning to the adjustment under a wage tax (marked lines), we observe that
the surge in output and hours is roughly one third of the magnitude as in the
opposed scenario. This is because the reduction in the real rate is many times
weaker, due to the fact that real marginal costs and prices do not decline nearly
as much as in the adjustment under a payroll tax. This is for two reasons. The
first is that a given decline in the SCR has a weaker effect on marginal costs if
taxes are collected from workers. In this case, the reduction in the SCR does
not directly enter marginal costs  as it is the case in under payroll taxes  but
only affects marginal costs indirectly via slowly adjusting nominal wages. The
second reason is that the magnitude of the decline in the SCR itself is smaller,
from the reasoning outlined at the beginning of this section.
Concerning the adjustment of wages, we again observe a decline in newly set
nominal wages but a rise in after-tax real wages. The explanation is similar to
the one in the scenario of taxing firms: The reduction of payroll taxes (instead
of a reduction of prices) pushes after-tax wages on a level exceeding the optimal
one for the given path of the MRS. As a result, newly set wages are reduced to
compensate for the reduction in the SCR.
Concluding with a comparison of the adjustment of nominal variables in both
scenarios, we observe that the decline in prices is many times stronger under
a payroll tax. Regarding wages, we also observe a larger negative deviation if
taxes are collected from firms, although the difference between both scenarios is
not nearly as great as for price inflation.14 The explanation why the decline in
14Accordingly, the implications of the statutory split for mean price dispersion are more
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wage inflation is stronger under a payroll tax lies in the equilibrium path of the
MRS. Only in this scenario it deviates negatively in the medium run, leading
labor unions to adjust nominal wages downwards.15
Productivity disturbances
The next figure shows the adjustment to a positive productivity shock in the
magnitude of one standard deviation.
Before discussing the implications of the liability side, we briefly discuss the
economy's general adjustment to the shock. The reduction in marginal costs
from the gain in productivity leads firms to lower prices, which in turn causes
the central bank to implement a decline in the real interest rate. This causes
households to increase consumption. Regarding output and hours, we observe
that labor demand, and with it hours, decline despite the surge in production
because the gain in productivity reduces the amount of hours required per unit
of output. The MRS deviates positively for about 1.5 years because the decline
in marginal utility overcompensates the decline in the disutility of labor. In
their decision on newly set wages, labor unions take into account this increase
in the MRS as well as the decline in consumer prices. As the latter dominates,
we observe a decline in wage inflation. Regarding real wages, the drop in prices
overcompensates the gradual decline of nominal wages, implying a positive de-
viation.
With increasing total labor compensation, the SCR has to decline to main-
tain a balanced budget for constant outflows of security program. In line with
the explanation at the beginning of this section, holding revenues constant re-
quires the SCR to drop by more under the taxation of firms, because the steady
state tax base is smaller. Notice that the effect on nominal variables originat-
ing from the productivity shock and from the resulting adjustment in the SCR
have the same sign, i.e. they complement each other. In accordance with the
discussion of the previous exercise, the decline in prices is significantly stronger
under a payroll tax, while the implication of the liability side for wage inflation
has the same direction but is smaller in magnitude.
important in the welfare analysis than its implications for mean wage dispersion.
15In explaining this path of the MRS, we start with the observation that price inflation
deviates positively from period 7 on. This inflation leads the central bank to raise the real
interest rate and thereby to lower consumption and output, which drags the MRS below its
steady state value during the late phase of the adjustment.
The positive deviation of inflation from period 7 has to be due to an increase in marginal
costs (barely visible in the plot), which constitute pre-tax real wages since the firm pays no
taxes in this scenario. The reason why we only observe a sustained increase in pre-tax real
wages under the collection of taxes from firm is the strong initial deflationary impulse occurring
in this case. This short-lived impulse pushing up real wages has a sustained impact because
nominal wages do only adjust sluggishly. Hence, in the late stage of the adjustment, the
remaining positive deviation of real wages is gradually dismantled by negative wage inflation
and positive price inflation. In the opposed scenario of a wage tax, the deflationary impulse is
comparably negligible while the initial decline in the SCR pushing up the after-tax real wage
has no direct effect on marginal costs.
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Figure 3: Positive one STD productivity shock.
Solid lines: taxing firms vs. marked lines: taxing workers.
Demand disturbances
The next figure shows the adjustment to a positive government spending shock
in the magnitude of one standard deviation. Regarding the general adjustment,
we observe that the bulk of additional government consumption is covered by
a surge in output, which implies a very mild consumption crowding out. This
is due to wage rigidity: As nominal wages slowly adjust to the increment in
disutility of labor, the rise in output only causes a moderate hike in marginal
costs. This limits the induced inflation and thereby reduces the strength of
the resulting contractionary monetary policy stance, i.e. of the driving force of
consumption crowding out. The output expansion implies an increase in total
labor compensation which requires a downward adjustment of the SCR.
Under taxation of workers, marginal costs are only affected by the growth
in nominal wages resulting from the surge in disutility of labor. The emerging
inflationary pressure leads the central bank to implement a rise in the real
rate, causing consumption to decline. The adjustment of real marginal costs is
substantially different if social contributions are collected as a payroll tax. In
this case, the reduction in the SCR overcompensates the rise in nominal wages at
the beginning of the adjustment, leading to the hump-shaped path of inflation.
The resulting monetary policy causes consumption to decline in a hump-shaped
18
manner as well.
In the context of demand disturbances, no clear-cut picture arises on which
liability side is more favorable in terms of reducing nominal volatility. The
welfare analysis will show that using a wage tax slightly reduces the volatility
of prices and wages, but in an insignificant magnitude.
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Figure 4: Positive one STD government spending shock.
Solid lines: taxing firms vs. marked lines: taxing workers.
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4 Welfare analysis
This section compares welfare costs of business cycle fluctuations arising if social
contributions are levied from workers with the costs arising if they are levied
from firms. Welfare costs are measured by ν, the consumption compensation for
business cycle fluctuations. If consumption in the deterministic steady state is
changed by ν percent, the agent is as well off in the deterministic steady state as
in the ergodic distribution of the model.16 This commonly applied measure goes
back to Lucas (1987) and Lucas (2003). Welfare is defined as the discounted
sum of future and present flow utility, so it holds that
E
∞∑
t=0
βtU (ct, nt) =
∞∑
t=0
βtU ((1 + ν) c, n) . (17)
That is, the unconditional expectation of the agent's welfare in the ergodic dis-
tribution of the model (LHS) equals his/her welfare in the deterministic steady
state of the model, given that consumption is scaled down by by ν (RHS).
Following Evers (2012), Taylor-Approximations are applied on both sides to
express ν as a function of first and second moments of the ergodic distribution.
This allows to decompose the total welfare loss arising from business cycle fluc-
tuations into its components.17 That is, it is dismantled into the contributions
of volatility effects (volatility in consumption and hours in the ergodic distribu-
tion) and level effects (unconditional expectations of consumption and hours in
the ergodic distribution differ from their deterministic steady state values).
As shown by Kim and Kim (2003), meaningful welfare analyses require a
second-order accurate approximation to the system of equations. To obtain
second-order accurate population moments that I use for the welfare function,
the equilibrium conditions are not linearized but written in a recursive form as in
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007). Then, Dynare is used to apply a second-order
accurate perturbation method. Since welfare analyses require a high degree
of accuracy, I do not conducting simulations but apply the nonlinear moving
average method by Lan and Meyer-Gohde (2013) to obtain population moments
analytically.18
In the following, I compute consumption compensations νwage tax and νpayroll tax
that arise if social contributions are fully levied as wage tax respectively as pay-
roll tax. Comparing welfare costs arising under both liability sides is only mean-
ingful if the welfare in both ergodic distributions is compared to the same level
of welfare in the deterministic steady state. That is, νwage tax and νpayroll tax
can only by compared if they are computed with the same deterministic steady
state as reference point. This is given for exercise at hand because LSE holds
16As the agent suffers from stochastic in the model, consumption in the deterministic envi-
ronment has to be scaled down, so the sign of ν is negative.
17The functions and details on their derivation are provided in the appendix.
18The Dynare add-on provided by the authors does not directly report variances around
deterministic steady state values, as required to compute consumption compensations. The
required statistics can easily be recovered from the output of the software. Details are available
upon request.
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in the model and implies that the flexible-price allocation prevailing in the de-
terministic steady state is identical under both liability sides.
4.1 Welfare results for the baseline model
This subsection reports welfare results for the baseline model with exogenously
fluctuating social security benefits. The table shows welfare costs of fluctuations
and moments of selected macro aggregates in dependency of the liability side.
Columns labeled 'workers' ('firms') report figures arising if social contributions
take the form of a wage tax (payroll tax). In addition to the full stochastic
setup, the results are also reported for productivity and demand disturbances
in isolation.
Table 2: Welfare costs of fluctuations, baseline model
Both shocks Only productivity shocks Only Demand shocks
Workers Firms %-diff. Workers Firms %-diff. Workers Firms %-diff.
Welfare loss of fluctuations -0.0800 -0.0890 -11.25 -0.0797 -0.0887 -11.29 -0.0009 -0.0025 -171.10
Decomposition:
mean cons.: -0.1458 -0.1582 -15.58 -0.1455 -0.1580 -15.64 -0.0016 -0.0039 -246.70
mean hours: 0.0735 0.0770 4.31 0.0734 0.0768 4.35 0.0010 0.0017 71.07
volatility cons.: -0.0061 -0.0061 0.02 -0.0061 -0.0061 0.03 -0.0001 -0.0001 2.53
volaility hours: -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.01 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.02 -0.0002 -0.0002 1.99
Moments
Mean output? 0.9165 0.9164 -0.08 0.9165 0.9164 -0.08 0.9176 0.9176 -0.02
Mean consumption? 0.7166 0.7165 -0.12 0.7166 0.7165 -0.12 0.7176 0.7176 -0.02
Mean hours? 0.9169 0.9168 -0.04 0.9169 0.9168 -0.04 0.9176 0.9176 -0.01
Std. dev. consumption 0.0079 0.0078 -0.32 0.0079 0.0078 -0.32 0.0010 0.0008 -13.54
Std. dev. hours 0.0056 0.0056 2.26 0.0053 0.0054 4.60 0.0020 0.0019 -48.77
Std. dev. SCR 0.0031 0.0041 35.78 0.0030 0.0041 35.88 0.0029 0.0039 35.57
Std. dev. inflation 0.0028 0.0029 5.99 0.0028 0.0029 5.98 0.0001 0.0005 264.66
Std. dev. wage inflation 0.0017 0.0018 2.87 0.0017 0.0018 2.87 0.0001 0.0002 66.00
Mean disp. good variationsX 0.2720 0.3054 12.29 0.2720 0.3053 12.27 0.0008 0.0100 1229.78
Mean disp. labor typesX 0.1453 0.1537 5.78 0.1452 0.1536 5.79 0.0011 0.0031 175.54
?Changes are reported in units per mill.
XDispersion terms are reported as deviations from one in units per mill.
Before turning to the implications of the liability side, this section makes two
general observations, one regarding the predominant source of the welfare losses
and one regarding how they originate from the model structure. Concerning
the source, first notice the relative importance of volatility and level effects.
As apparent in the welfare decomposition, the contributions of volatility in
consumption and hours to total business cycle costs are negligible compared
to the contributions of the level effects. Next notice that the welfare costs
originating from demand shocks are negligible relative to the costs stemming
from productivity shocks.19 This allows us to focus in the following discussion
19This is well compatible with the arguing provided in this section, which ultimately at-
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on the level effects brought about by productivity disturbances.
Regarding these level effects, we observe that stochastics in the model cause
the household to consume less and work fewer hours, resulting in a welfare re-
duction (the loss from consuming less is roughly twice as large as the gain from
reducing working hours). This is due to a decline in productivity in the stochas-
tic environment, which can be traced back to volatility in price and wages.
The well-known chain of reasoning starts with the observation that nominal re-
adjustment, on the side of good producers and labor unions, is accompanied by
dispersion among prices and wages. Since under Cavlo rigidity only a random
share of firms and unions is allowed to re-adjust prices and wages in a given
period, the willingness to do so causes newly set prices and wages to differ from
non-adjusted ones. While price dispersion causes households to consume differ-
ing quantities of different good variations, wage dispersion leads firms to employ
varying amounts of different types of labor. As a result, Jensen's Inequality ap-
plies for aggregators (2) and (6). This implies an efficiency loss, as a higher
amount of good variations is required to bundle one unit of the final good, and
more total labor is required to bundle one unit of the labor composite. The loss
in efficiency manifests itself in the emergence of resource costs in the aggregate
resource constraint (16).
Now we turn to the discussion of the main result of this paper, the impli-
cations of the liability side for welfare costs of business cycle fluctuations. If
the social system is financed by a payroll tax, these costs are by 11.25% higher
than if the system is funded by a wage tax. To understand this finding, first
note that the results validate the intuition that a wage tax implies a more stable
SCR, which in turn leads to more stable prices and wages: Under the use of a
wage tax, the volatility in the SCR is by 35.78% smaller, leading to a reduction
of the standard deviations of price and wage inflation by 5.99% and 2.87% re-
spectively.20 In accordance with the explanation above, a decline in price and
wage volatility reduces the expected magnitudes of price and wage dispersion
by 12.29% and 5.78%. As dispersion among prices and wages was shown to be
the main driver for the welfare loss of business cycle fluctuations, the latter are
smaller if the social system is funded by a wage tax.
Up to this point, I have compared the use of a wage tax with the use of a
payroll tax. Figure 7 in the appendix considers intermediate cases by plotting
the total welfare loss and the standard deviation of the SCR in dependency of
the statutory breakdown of social contributions between firms and workers. It
shows that both variables depend almost linearly on the statutory breakdown.
tributes the welfare loss to nominal volatility. Comparing the IRFs of productivity and demand
shocks shows that the movement in prices and wages induced by productivity shocks is at least
ten times larger.
20The fact that price volatility declines by more than wage volatility is in line with the IRFs
presented in section 3.
22
4.2 Generalizing the dynamics of the funding gap
While the dynamic pattern of revenues adjustments in the baseline calibration
is empirically plausable for Germany, this subsection generalizes the analysis by
considering a board set of dynamics. This allows to build additional intuition
for the result, and to relate the quantitative findings also to different countries.
As described in section 2.4, dynamic patterns of revenue adjustments are
generated by modeling variability in outflows ssbt, which has otherwise no con-
sequence in the model. To be able to generate a broad set of patterns of revenues
adjustments (along the dimensions of volatility and correlation with output),
this section abandons the assumption of exogenously fluctuating outflows and
instead establishes an ad-hoc link between ssbt and output.
21 To this aim, ηt
(the time-variant component of ssbt in equation (14)) is is governed by
ηt = ρ
ssbηt−t + αssbt + β
A
t (18)
where At is the innovation of the process for technology entering production
function (5). Since productivity disturbances are the predominant driver for
business cycle fluctuations in the model, α and β govern the sign and the
strength of the dynamic link between outflows and output. Varying the two
parameters therefore allows to cover a broad set of dynamic patterns in revenue
adjustments.22
The plot below shows welfare results (i.e. the percentage reduction in welfare
costs resulting from a full shift of taxation from firms to workers) in dependency
of the dynamic pattern of revenue adjustments, characterized by their volatility
and their correlation with output. For the reasons outlined in section 2.4, dy-
namic patterns are identified by the moments σ(scrt) and ρ(scrt, gdpt) of SCR
adjustments that arise under equal taxation of both sides.23
21From the reasoning of section 2.4, the ad-hoc nature of the dependency is of no conse-
quence for the results, as outflows have no role in the model.
22To shed light into how this specification of ηt allows to determine the correlation of the
revenue gap and output, this footnote contrasts the cases of β > 0 and β < 0. β > 0 links
output fluctuations to rectified fluctuations in social security benefits (At causes output and
ssbt to move in the same direction). This reduces the cyclical surplus of the system that
is implied by the cyclicality of the tax base, and thereby the resulting negative correlation
between SCR and output. E.g. in a recession, output and the tax base decline, implying
ceteris paribus an upward-adjustment in revenues. The size of this adjustment is smaller if
ssbt drops at the same time. In contrast, β < 0 strengthens the cyclical surplus of the system,
since At moves output and outflows in opposed directions. E.g. in a recession, the decline in
the tax base is accompanied by an increase in outflows, which requires a stronger upwards-
adjustment in revenues. This elevates the negative correlation between output and the SCR
stemming from the cyclicality of the tax base.
Hence, α and β govern the direction of the co-movement of ssbt and outflows, as well as the
relative weight of independent variations (via ssbt ) and variations linked to the cycle (via 
A
t ).
This allows to determine the dynamic pattern of revenue adjustments along the dimensions
of their volatility as well as their correlation to output fluctuations.
23The plot does not consider positive correlations between SCR and output because they
are of minor empirical relevance according to the findings of Burda and Weder (2014).
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Figure 5: %-increase in welfare costs of business cycle fluctuations from full shift
of taxation from workers towards firms.
The dynamic patterns of revenue adjustments observed in specific countries
correspond to positions on the grid. Using the data from table 4 and 6 for
observed SCR dynamics (mirroring revenue adjustments) and data from table 5
for the statutory breakdown of payroll taxation indicates that there is room for
substantial welfare gains in many OECD countries. For example, the feasible
reduction of business cycle costs in Germany, France, Belgium and Austria
amount to roughly 7%, 6%, 8% and 5% respectively.
The plot also allows to build additional intuition for the mechanism driv-
ing the results. The two observations that I explain in the following are firstly
that the welfare gain increases in σ(scrt) (i.e. in the volatility of the underly-
ing funding gap) for a given ρ(scrt, Yt), and secondly that the gain increases in
−ρ(scrt, Yt) for a given σ(scrt). The first observation is straightforward to ex-
plain. If required adjustments in the SCR are stronger, the contribution of SCR
adjustments to total nominal volatility is higher. It follows that a proportionate
reduction of nominal volatility stemming from this source (induced by shifting
the taxation) has a stronger impact on overall nominal volatility and thereby
welfare costs.
To understand the second observation, it is useful to distinguish between the
following two driving forces of movement in nominal variables: While most of
the movement is driven by exogenous disturbances (predominantly productivity
shocks), another portion of movement in prices and wages is due to adjustments
of the SCR. Now reconsider the IRFs presented in section 3 to learn about how
the impulses on prices and wages originating from both sources are related. Fig-
ure 3 shows that productivity disturbances push output in the opposed direction
than prices and wages,24 while figure 2 shows that movements in the SCR exert,
independently of the liability side, a rectified impulse on prices and wages.
24In this figure, the adjustment to the shock is accompanied by an adjustment in the SCR.
However, the SCR change has a small influence on the overall adjustment relative to the
productivity shock and can be neglected in the context of the statement.
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This observation allows to understand why the welfare gain increases in the
direction of −ρ(scrt, Yt). Consider first the limiting case of ρ(scrt, gdpt) = 0.
This implies that the impulse on nominal variables resulting from productivity
shocks (assumed to be the online driver of output fluctuations for the sake of
the argument) is not correlated with the impulse stemming from SCR adjust-
ments. Hence, both impulses are as likely to cancel each other out as they are
likely to complement each other. Reducing the magnitude of impulses from SCR
changes (by changing the liability side) does therefore also reduce the magni-
tude of offset if both impulses happen oppose each other. This undesirable side
effect reduces the reduction in total nominal volatility that can be achieved by
switching the liability side. That does not apply in the other limiting case of
ρ(scrt, gdpt) = −1. As we know from the inspection of the IRF, if productiv-
ity shocks (driving GDP) and SCR adjustments are negatively correlated, the
associated impulses on nominal variables are positively correlated. It follows
that offset between both impulses has a probability of zero. Hence, limiting
the size of impulses originating from SCR changes does not entail a reduction
in the degree of possible offset. Inspecting the two extreme cases shows that
the reduction in nominal volatility (and thereby the welfare gain) that can be
induced by shifting taxation is larger the less likely it is for both impulses to
oppose each other, i.e. the higher the negative correlation between SCR and
output.
5 Robustness analysis
This section examines the sensibility of the results to parameter choices. While
table A replicates the results from the baseline calibration depicted in figure 5
above, the remaining tables report the results for modifications of the model.
Table 3: Robustness exercises
Baseline calibration
SD(scrt) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0.1 3.7 4.2 4.7 5.2 5.6 6.0 6.3
0.2 4.2 5.2 6.7 7.5 8.5 9.5 10.4
0.3 4.7 6.2 8.3 9.9 11.5 12.9 14.5
0.4 4.6 7.9 9.5 11.6 14.3 16.5 18.1
0.5 6.3 8.8 11.6 14.0 16.9 19.6 22.5
0.6 6.3 9.8 12.9 16.4 20.1 22.8 25.9
-c
o
rr
(s
cr
t
,G
D
P
t
)
0.7 7.3 11.3 15.4 18.5 22.4 26.5 28.9
A: Avg. lifetime prices and wages of one year
SD(scrt) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0.1 3.2 3.8 4.4 4.8 5.4 5.6 6.2
0.2 3.7 4.6 6.2 7.0 8.2 9.0 10.2
0.3 4.2 6.5 7.6 9.4 10.9 12.4 13.9
0.4 5.3 7.3 9.7 12.0 13.7 15.8 17.9
0.5 5.2 8.2 11.0 14.2 16.2 18.8 21.7
0.6 6.3 9.7 12.8 16.2 19.3 21.9 25.6
-c
o
rr
(s
cr
t
,G
D
P
t
)
0.7 6.2 11.2 14.1 18.3 21.5 25.6 27.1
B: Less responsive monetary policy
SD(scrt) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0.1 3.8 4.3 4.7 5.0 5.3 5.6 5.8
0.2 4.2 4.8 6.0 6.5 7.4 8.1 8.8
0.3 4.6 6.2 7.0 8.3 9.4 10.5 11.7
0.4 5.4 6.8 8.5 10.1 11.4 13.0 14.5
0.5 5.3 7.5 9.4 11.7 13.7 15.5 17.1
0.6 6.1 8.6 10.8 13.2 15.3 17.7 19.9
-c
o
rr
(s
cr
t
,G
D
P
t
)
0.7 6.0 8.8 12.1 15.1 17.4 19.7 19.7
C: Smaller social security system
SD(scrt) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0.1 3.2 3.7 4.1 4.6 4.9 5.4 5.7
0.2 3.6 4.6 5.7 6.9 8.0 9.0 9.6
0.3 4.1 5.5 7.5 9.2 10.9 12.5 13.3
0.4 4.6 7.1 9.5 11.6 14.1 15.9 17.5
0.5 5.1 8.6 11.4 13.7 16.5 19.8 22.2
0.6 5.6 9.5 12.5 16.5 19.5 22.8 26.6
-c
o
rr
(s
cr
t
,G
D
P
t
)
0.7 6.1 11.5 14.3 18.5 22.3 25.0 25.0
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Exercise A: Avg. lifetime of prices and wages of one year
Calvo-Probabilities of price and wage adjustments are set to θ = θw = 0.75,
implying an average lifetime of prices and wages of one year. Relative to the
baseline calibration prices are more sticky, whereas wage rigidity is almost iden-
tical. The welfare difference between the outcomes under the taxation of firms
and workers shrinks to a small extent, not qualitatively changing the results.
The reason is that the difference whether changes in the SCR enter marginal
costs directly (if firms are taxed) or via slowly adjusting wages (if workers are
taxed) matters less for the volatility of inflation if prices are more sticky.
Exercise B: Less active monetary policy
The assumption of independent monetary policy maintained in the baseline
version of the model is odd for countries belonging to the European Monetary
Union. While a thorough analysis requires an open-economy setup  which is
a promising direction for further research  this robustness exercise seeks to
draw near this analysis by reducing the responsiveness of monetary policy. In
this exercise the model represents a country of the EMU core region defined
as Germany, France, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands. As the size of the
social system exceeds 14% GDP in all of these countries (see table 5 in the ap-
pendix), they well match the calibration for sizable welfare states. With a total
population of 183.12 million, this set covers more than half of the population in
the Eurozone and has, according to the ECB's 2014 HICP country weights, a
weight of 60.2% in the average inflation measure.
From the perspective of an individual Eurozone country, the responsiveness
of monetary policy to the domestic macroeconomic environment does not only
depend on the size of this country, but also on the synchronization between this
country's and other Eurozone countries' business cycles.25 A large majority
of the studies on European business cycle synchronization (surveyed e.g. by
de Haan (2008) and Jones et al. (2012)) find a high degree of synchronization
across the EMU core counties, which in all studies include Germany, France
and Austria.26 On the background of these empirical findings, this robustness
exercise treats the EMU core as one country entering the measure of union-wide
inflation with a weight of 60.2%.27 The adjustment in this exercise consists of
adapting the active portion of monetary policy (i.e. the change of the nominal
interest rate exceeding the inflation rate) to the weight of the EMU core. Given
25In the limiting case of perfect synchronization between all member countries, a union-wide
monetary policy could not be distinguished from the individual conduct of monetary policy
in all member countries.
26This is in line with the classic study of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) who found that
the set defined as EMU core in this exercise is a suitable candidate for a currency area because
of the high correlation of supply shocks across these countries.
27Equivalently, one can think of the model to represent one country belonging to the set
under the assumption of perfect correlation of inflation rates.
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that the baseline calibration features the standard inflation coefficient of 1.5,
the responsiveness of monetary policy to inflation in the EMU core amounts to
αpicore = 1 + 0.5 ∗ 0.602 = 1.301. Panel C shows that the results become slightly
weaker, but do not change qualitatively.
Exercise C: Smaller social security system
Reducing the steady state size of the social security system to 10% GDP (i.e.
ssb = 0.09) only causes a slight reduction of the relevance of the liability side.
However, notice that the dynamic properties of the SCR were held constant in
this exercise.
6 Conclusion
This paper is the first to examine LSE of labor taxation in a general equilib-
rium model. It augments the 'classic' notion of LSE by the insight that the
liability side of labor taxation matters for the volatility of prices and wages
and thereby for the welfare costs of business cycle fluctations. It employs a
standard DSGE model calibrated for a member state of the Eurozone featuring
empirically plausible SCR dynamics to quantify this finding. The result is that
a full shift of social contribution from firms to workers reduces the standard
deviation of prices and wages by 5.99% and 2.87%, implying a reduction in the
welfare loss of 11.25%. Improving the design of a social system along this di-
mension constitutes a Pareto improvement, given that the one-time change in
the tax structure is accompanied by a compensating rise in wages. From the
perspective of a policymaker, this result is of relevance since the implementation
of the Pareto improvement does not require to dispose public funds, and does
not interfere with the property of social systems to provide stabilization in a
Keynesian fashion.
Regarding real-world applicability, the findings of this study have to be taken
with a grain of salt. While the structure of the model is sufficiently rich to al-
low for the mechanism that gives rise to the macroeconomic relevance of the
statutory split, it is hardly encompassing enough to provide a realistic account
of European economies. There are several modeling dimensions which are pre-
sumably relevant for the results, and therefore constitute a promising direction
for further research. Introducing credit constrained Rule-of-Thumb consumers
who do not earn profit income as in Galí et al. (2004) would allow to account
for short-term redistribution in the course of unanticipated SCR changes. This
would affect aggregate demand via the different propensities to consume be-
tween both groups. Further extensions of potential interest are the inclusion
of capital, as well as allowing for trade in an open economy setup. The latter
generalization is especially interesting if the model represents a member country
of a monetary union. Since the literature on optimal currency areas identifies
price stickiness as the root for the costs of belonging to a union, the liability
side with its impact on price setting is of potential relevance in this context.
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7 Appendix
Derivation of (16):
Starting with
Nt =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
nt (i, j) didj =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
nt (i, j)
nt (i)
nt (i) didj
one can use (7) to substitute for the fraction:
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(
wt (j)
Wt
)−w
nt (i) didj =
∫ 1
0
(
wt (j)
Wt
)−w ∫ 1
0
nt (i) didj
since the inner integral is constant in j,
=
∫ 1
0
(
wt (j)
Wt
)−w
dj
∫ 1
0
nt (i) di = s
w
t
∫ 1
0
nt (i) di.
Equating the production function (5) with firm-specific total demand (10) to
evoke market clearing on the firm level, one obtains nt (i) =
(
pt(i)
Pt
)−
Ct+Gt
At
.
Substituting yields
= swt
∫ 1
0
(
pt (i)
Pt
)−
di
Ct +Gt
At
= swt s
p
t
Ct +Gt
At
.
Derivation of welfare Functions:
The sum on the LHS of equation (17) comprises unconditional expectations
of utility on the ergodic distribution, while the sum on the RHS comprises utility
in the deterministic steady state. As neither quantity depends on time and they
are therefore constant in the sum, (17) can be written as
1
1− βEU (ct, nt) =
1
1− βU ((1 + ν) c, n)
E [U (ct, nt)] = U ((1 + ν) c, n)
On the LHS, applying a second-order Taylor approximation in ct and nt
around the deterministic steady state yields
U + UCE [ct − c] + UCC
2
E [ct − c]2 + UNE [nt − n] + UNN
2
E [nt − n]2
where the bar denotes variables of the deterministic steady state and the cross
term is neglected as commonly done in the literature. On the RHS, applying
a first-order Taylor approximation in ν around the deterministic steady state
yields
U +
δU
δν
ν .
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It follows that the total consumption compensation for business cycle fluctua-
tions is a sum of the following components of the total welfare loss:
νmean C =
(
∂U/∂ν
)−1
UCE [ct − c]
νmean N =
(
∂U/∂ν
)−1
UNE [nt − n]
νvolatility C =
(
∂U/∂ν
)−1
0.5UCCE [ct − c]2
νvolatility N =
(
∂U/∂ν
)−1
0.5UNNE [nt − n]2
Tables:
Table 4: Payroll taxes over time, correlation between SCR and GDP
Ratio of payroll taxes Correlation of annual payroll
to total compensation payroll tax rate with GDP*
1970-89 1990-2012 1970-1989 1990-2012 1970-2012
Germany 0.28 0.34 -0.48 -0.56 -0.51
Sweden 0.24 0.29 -0.56 0.41 0.13
France 0.37 0.41 -0.19 -0.34 -0.28
Netherlands 0.31 0.29 -0.47 0.19 -0.01
UK 0.22 0.26 0.29 0.12 0.22
Denmark 0.09 0.16 -0.04 0.20 0.15
Finland 0.14 0.15 -0.47 -0.15 -0.22
Japan 0.17 0.25 -0.45 -0.05 -0.24
Belgium 0.32 0.39 -0.69 -0.57 -0.63
Italy 0.36 0.38 -0.30 -0.04 -0.10
Austria 0.30 0.35 -0.41 -0.58 -0.50
Australia 0.01 0.01 -0.34 0.04 -0.23
Norway 0.23 0.21 0.21 -0.07 0.14
Canada 0.07 0.09 -0.30 -0.33 -0.32
New Zealand 0.10 0.33 0.25
South Korea 0.10 0.18 -0.44 -0.43 -0.39
Spain 0.25 0.30 -0.65 -0.24 -0.38
US 0.10 0.12 0.29 -0.48 -0.02
Source: Burda and Weder (2014), data from OECD.
*Tax rates and log real GDP are HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter λ = 6.25.
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Table 5: Social security systems in the EU, 2012
Social security Employee's
contributions, % of GDP share in %
Austria 14.5 40
Belgium 14.2 30
Czech Republic 15.4 20
Denmark 1.0 95
Estonia 11.9 7
Finland 12.6 22
France 16.7 24
Germany 14.2 44
Greece 10.6 39
Hungary 12.9 60
Ireland 4.6 23
Italy 13.4 18
Luxembourg 11.0 46
Netherlands 14.8 43
Norway 9.5 33
Poland 11.4 40
Portugal 9.3 39
Slovak Republic 12.3 24
Spain 12.1 16
Sweden 10.1 26
United Kingdom 6.7 40
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics 2012
Table 6: Volatility of social contributions rate
Std. dev.
Country SCR in % Sample
Austria 0.21 76-13
Belgium 0.19 95-13
Cyprus 0.42 95-13
Germany 0.38 91-13
Estonia 0.46 95-14
Spain 0.13 95-13
Finland 0.73 75-13
France 0.32 74-14
Greece 0.75 00-13
Italy 0.65 92-14
Luxembourg 0.24 85-14
Latvia 0.86 92-13
Malta 0.16 95-13
Netherlands 0.83 71-13
Portugal 0.22 95-13
Slovenia 0.20 91-13
Slovakia 1.19 95-14
SCR constructed as social contributions divided by
compensation of employees. Std. dev. reports the
expected deviation from HP-filtered series (λ = 6.25).
The approach is analogous to Burda and Weder (2014).
Source: Eurostat government statistics.
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